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Abstract
It is often argued, though mostly informally, that outward foreign direct investment
(FDI) is a synonym for the export of employment and thus detrimental to the home
economy. To see whether and under what conditions this intuition indeed holds true, we
construct a model of unionized duopoly and examine welfare implications of outward FDI
by paying special attention to the role of domestic competition. We ¯nd that the welfare
e®ect of FDI is largely non-monotonic, and there are indeed such things as \excessive
FDI." We also show that, when FDI reduces welfare, this negative e®ect arises more at
the expense of consumers rather than the unions: in fact, quite contrary to the popular
belief, FDI may actually bene¯t the unions because it serves to soften price competition
between them. The paper points out that welfare e®ects of outward FDI hinges crucially
on the nature of domestic competition, and policymakers must carefully take this aspect
into consideration.
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1 Introduction
Should a government encourage, or even subsidize, globalization of domestic ¯rms? If so, then
to what extent? With the increasing degree of globalization,1 those questions become more
and more critical for policymakers these days. Speci¯cally at issue, regarding those questions,
is the welfare e®ect of outward FDI on the home country: a policy intervention that encourages
domestic ¯rms to expand abroad can be justi¯ed only if outward FDI indeed proves to be
welfare-improving. While the answer to this question is not necessarily straightforward, many
government authorities in reality appear to be in favor of outward FDI and are often eager
to encourage globalization of domestic ¯rms in various ways. To name a few, the Canadian
Trade Commissioner Service and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) provide
information and various types of support, as one of their missions, to help Canadian and
Japanese ¯rms, respectively, to expand overseas. The Swiss Organization for Investment
Facilitation (SOFI) was set up in 1997 by the Swiss Secretariat for Economic A®airs to o®er
a wide scope of services to promote outward FDI. The Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade
organizes fairs named Expotecnia in various countries in an attempt to boost outward FDI as
well as exports. Countries such as Singapore, South Korea and Mexico have gone even further
by creating what is called \comfort zones" in host countries to facilitate outward FDI.2 In
many cases, attempts are made not only to reduce or remove potential barriers but also to
actively promote outward FDI through several policy instruments, ranging from disseminating
information on investment opportunities to providing investment insurance against political
risk.
This tendency seems to suggest that there is an emerging global consensus, at least among
policymakers, that outward FDI is generally bene¯cial for the home country and should there-
fore be encouraged. To justify this policy stance, there is certainly a bright side of outward
FDI because ¯rms that undertake FDI can improve their productive e±ciency through sev-
eral channels. First, ¯rms may invest abroad to save transport costs, including tari®s and
other non-tari® trade barriers, which allows them to serve the foreign market more e±ciently.
1The amount of outward FDI has steadily increased over time and now reached 778.7 billion dollars world-
wide in 2005, compared to the annual average of 553.1 billion over 1994-1999 (UNCTAD, World Investment
Report 2006).
2One notable example of comfort zones is the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park. The basic idea
behind this project is \to o®er a one-stop point of access to various government ministries as well as Singapore-
style education, health and recreation facilities, and an international school (UNCTAD, World Investment
Report 2006, p.211)."
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Second, especially when ¯rms invest in developing economies, FDI allows them to gain ac-
cess to cheap raw material and labor force. Finally, outward FDI is also a means to acquire
knowledge and to diversify country risk. Proponents of outward FDI would thus argue that
FDI plays quite a similar role to R&D investment, which is normally welfare-improving if its
investment cost is negligible, directed at the foreign market.
Despite those virtues, however, there may also be a cost associated with outward FDI
when the production process involves some immobile factors such as labor. In such a case,
the e®ect of outward FDI is no longer identical to that of R&D investment. It is often argued,
though mostly informally, that FDI can be regarded as the export of employment and hence
is detrimental to workers in the home country. Based on this argument, the overall welfare
e®ect of FDI on the home country is ultimately determined by the tradeo® between ¯rms'
gains and workers' losses. FDI is not necessarily welfare-improving if ¯rms gain only at the
expense of domestic workers.3
While the welfare analysis of outward FDI o®ers critical policy implications, studies on
the e®ect of outward FDI are relatively scarce, both theoretically and empirically.4 The paper
intends to ¯ll this gap. In particular, the main purpose of this paper is to examine whether and
under what circumstances the intuition mentioned above (that outward FDI may reduce social
welfare) actually holds true. Special attention is paid to the role of domestic competition,
i.e., how welfare implications of FDI are related to and in°uenced by the nature of market
competition in the domestic market. To this end, we construct a model of unionized duopoly
where there are two downstream ¯rms, ¯rms A and B, and two unions (or, more generally,
upstream suppliers). Each ¯rm procures labor input from its own union which possesses some
bargaining power. We then look at a situation where ¯rm A ¯rst determines whether to set
up a plant in the foreign market and then ¯rm B determines whether to follow its rival: for
expositional clarity, we say that the ¯rst FDI (the second FDI) is undertaken when ¯rm A
(¯rm B) sets up a foreign plant.
Within this framework, we examine welfare and policy implications of outward FDI. We
¯rst show that when there is only one domestic ¯rm in the market to begin with, outward
FDI is always welfare-improving when the home and foreign markets are comparable in size.
3For instance, Skaksen and S¿rensen (2001) show that unions are likely to lose on FDI if domestic and
foreign activities are substitutable.
4The literature on the welfare e®ect of FDI has mainly focused on the e®ect of inward FDI, i.e., the e®ect
of FDI on the host country. See Lipsey (2004) for an extensive survey on this issue.
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Given this result, one might be tempted to conjecture that outward FDI is in general welfare-
improving even in the presence of strong labor unions. As it turns out, however, this conclusion
does not necessarily hold true with the addition of another rival ¯rm. When there are more
than one domestic ¯rm-union pair, one ¯rm's FDI decision a®ects not only its own union but
also the other union as well. The main ¯ndings of the paper are summarized as follows:
1. FDI may reduce welfare in the presence of domestic competition. In particular, when
the home and foreign markets are comparable in size, the second FDI always reduces
welfare. Moreover, this holds true even when we disregard any ¯xed cost necessary to
set up foreign plants, i.e., the e®ect of outward FDI can be purely negative. In general,
an asymmetric pattern of FDI is socially desirable and hence the amount of FDI can
easily be excessive in that sense.
2. The main reason why FDI reduces welfare is a reduction in consumer surplus. That
is, FDI reduces welfare at the expense of consumers, rather than the unions. In fact,
under certain conditions, the second FDI actually bene¯ts the unions because it serves
to soften price competition between them.
At the core of these results is the presence of domestic competition, which gives rise to
e®ects that are hardly straightforward and have critical bearings on social welfare. The reason
why the second FDI reduces social welfare and is especially detrimental to consumers is as
follows. When a ¯rm sets up a foreign plant, its union is consequently forced to concentrate
on the home market that it can serve more e®ectively, and thus responds to this by raising
its wage. The magnitude of this e®ect, however, depends heavily on the structure of FDI.
When only one of the two ¯rms undertakes FDI, there arises a di®erential between them in
the cost of supplying to the foreign market. Because of this, the union of the less productive
¯rm, the one that does not undertake FDI, must lower its wage to stay competitive in the
foreign market, and intense price rivalry between the unions arises as a result: the presence
of the rival ¯rm thus functions as an anchor to keep the wages low in the domestic market.
This is welfare-improving since lower wages lead to more output, which particularly bene¯ts
consumers. The e®ect of this price rivalry is totally wiped out, however, when the second (and
the last, in this case) FDI is undertaken. The wages suddenly go up and the increase in the
wages results in less output, which entails welfare losses. The result indicates that the welfare
e®ect of outward FDI hinges critically on the nature of domestic competition, especially in its
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relation to upstream suppliers: when the price rivalry among upstream suppliers is intense,
the amount of outward FDI can easily be excessive, even if the e®ect of ¯xed costs is fairly
negligible. In light of this ¯nding, we argue that any government intervention to encourage
outward FDI could be bene¯cial only up to some point.
While the ¯rst result roughly con¯rms a popular view that outward FDI may reduce social
welfare under certain conditions, it is important to note that this is not necessarily at the
expense of the unions, as one might anticipate. The more dominant factor in this is rather a
reduction in consumer surplus, resulting from higher wages. The e®ect of FDI, especially the
second one, on the unions is less clear. The ¯rst FDI puts downward pressure on the wages in
order to compete in the foreign market, and the price competition between the unions can be
excessively intense from the unions' viewpoint. The second FDI may be bene¯cial for them,
quite contrary to the popular belief, because it releases them from this downward pressure.
In other words, as the option of exporting is no longer available, the second FDI serves as a
strong commitment device to substantially soften price competition between the unions and
consequently bene¯ts them.
The present analysis is related to a line of research which deals with FDI in the presence
of labor unions (Bughin and Vannini, 1995; Zhao, 1995, 2001; Leahy and Montagna, 2000;
Skaksen and S¿rensen, 2001; Naylor and Santoni, 2003; Lommerud et al., 2003; Ishida and
Matsushima, 2005).5 Among them, the paper is most closely related to Lommerud et al.
(2003), on which our model framework is based. The di®erence lies in its goals and objectives:
their model has only one domestic ¯rm and hence does not consider domestic competition,
which proves to be crucial for our main results. This di®erence amounts to di®erent welfare
and policy implications. We show that an asymmetric pattern of FDI is normally desirable
from the social point of view whereas, in their mode with only one domestic ¯rm, this situation
by design cannot arise. Moreover, while they also point out that the amount of FDI can be
excessive, it is due to the presence of the ¯xed cost: that is, they show that there arises a case
in their model where the welfare gain from FDI is exceeded by the ¯xed cost of investment.
In contrast, we argue that the pure welfare e®ect of FDI is often negative, meaning that
FDI reduces welfare even when its ¯xed cost approaches zero, in the presence of domestic
5There is also a growing body of literature on international unionized oligopoly. Examples along this line
include Brander and Spencer (1988), Naylor (1998, 1999), Straume (2002, 2003), Skaksen (2004), Lommerud
et al. (2006), and Lommerud et al. (2009).
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competition.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the basic model. Section 3
analyzes as a benchmark a case with only one domestic ¯rm and shows that outward FDI
is normally welfare-improving. Section 4 extends the analysis to a case with two domestic
¯rms and illustrate how market outcomes driven by upstream competition are a®ected by
the amount of FDI. Section 5 extends the baseline model to include the option of full FDI.
Finally, section 6 o®ers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Basic environment
There are two markets, home and foreign, and two ¯rms, denoted by A and B. Both of
the ¯rms are initially located in the home market.6 Labor is unionized in the home market,
whereas it is not in the foreign market. Each ¯rm procures its labor input from its ¯rm-speci¯c
union: we refer to the union of ¯rm i as union i in the subsequent analysis. Needless to say,
the unions can interchangeably be regarded as the upstream input suppliers.
2.2 Production and market competition
Each ¯rm uses labor as the sole input and produces output in a constant-returns-to-scale
technology. Let xi denote i's sale in the home market and yi denote i's sale in the foreign
market (i 2 fA;Bg). We assume that the two countries are symmetric and the demand
function for each country is given by
p = 1¡ (xA + xB);
q = 1¡ (yA + yB):
p is the price level that prevails in the home market, while q is the price level in the foreign
market. The ¯rms engage in Cournot competition in each market. Following the convention,
we adopt the segmented market hypothesis where the ¯rms choose separate quantities for the
two markets. If a ¯rm in one market exports to the other, it must incur a transport cost per
6In Lommerud et al. (2003), there is only one ¯rm that initially is located in the home market. The other
¯rm is located in the foreign market and is non-unionized. The presence of domestic competition proves to give
rise to strategic interactions and welfare implications absent in the case with only one domestic ¯rm, as stated
in the introduction. It should also be noted that our main results are qualitatively unchanged even when there
exists a ¯rm in the foreign market. See Appendix B for the case with a foreign ¯rm.
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unit, denoted by t > 0. The transport cost is meant to capture various trade barriers, most
notably tari®s. Throughout the analysis, we restrict our attention to a case where t · 0:5 ´ ¹t.
Under this restriction, the ¯rms choose nonnegative quantities to export.
Within this framework we consider a situation where ¯rms A and B in the home market
may potentially undertake FDI by shifting part (or all) of their productive capacities abroad.
More precisely, each ¯rm chooses one of the three alternatives, denoted by j 2 fN;P; Fg:
1. No FDI (j = N): A ¯rm remains entirely in the domestic market and exports, if
necessary, to the foreign market.
2. Partial FDI (j = P ): A ¯rm sets up a plant in the foreign market, which is used strictly
to supply to that market.
3. Full FDI (j = F ): A ¯rm sets up a plant in the foreign market, which is used to supply
to both of the market.
In the case of partial FDI, the ¯rm operates two plants, one in each market, and the option of
importing from its foreign plant is ruled out.7 For most part, we examine the e®ect of partial
FDI by restricting attention to the case where full FDI is not an available option. The model
is later extended to incorporate the possibility of full FDI in section 5, mainly to show that
this addition would not a®ect the substance of our model.
2.3 Unions
The di®erence in unionization across the two markets implies di®erent costs of production.
In this paper we focus on a situation where the two unions are disintegrated and each union
independently supplies labor to its ¯rm.8 The competitive wage in the two countries is set
equal to ¹w = 0.9 Taking this as their reservation wage, the unions in the home market
independently set wages to maximize the following utility function:
ui = wizi; i = A;B:
zi is ¯rm i's production in the home country where zi = xi (zi = xi + yi) if its downstream
¯rm undertakes FDI (no FDI).
7This assumption can be considered as a type of capacity constraint.
8The assumption that the unions are disintegrated turns out to be insigni¯cant and innocuous as we can
obtain qualitatively similar results even when they are integrated as an industry-wide union. See Appendix B
for this extension.
9This is strictly to simplify the analysis since the competitive wage plays no role in a qualitative sense.
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2.4 Timing
The timing of the model is summarized as follows:
1. the domestic ¯rms sequentially choose whether to undertake FDI;
2. the unions simultaneously set wages to maximize their utilities;
3. the ¯rms simultaneously choose quantities for each country to maximize their pro¯ts.
3 Benchmark: one domestic ¯rm
3.1 Equilibrium wages and quantities
Before we proceed further, we ¯rst consider as a benchmark a case with only one domestic
¯rm (for the analysis, we abbreviate the superscript i). The analysis of this benchmark case
is instrumental in illustrating the role of domestic competition in unionized international
oligopoly.
(N-FDI): In the absence of FDI, the monopolist maximizes
max
x;y
(1¡ x¡ w)x+ (1¡ y ¡ t¡ w)y;
subject to the constraint that all the quantities are nonnegative (this evidently applies for all
subsequent problems). The ¯rst-order condition then leads to
x; y =
1¡ w
2
;
1¡ t¡ w
2
:
Taking this into account, the union sets its wage to maximize the union utility. Depending
on the transport cost, there arise two distinct cases. The ¯rm chooses a positive quantity to
export if the wage set by the union is su±ciently low relative to the transport cost, i.e.,
1¡ t ¸ w. In this case, the union maximizes
max
z
w(x+ y) =
w(2¡ t¡ 2w)
2
; s:t: 1¡ t ¸ w:
If the wage is su±ciently high, i.e., 1¡ t < w, the union maximizes
max
w
wx =
w(1¡ w)
2
; s:t: 1¡ t < w:
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It is then straightforward to obtain
w =
(2¡ t)
4
; x; y =
2 + t
8
;
2¡ 3t
8
:
Given the ¯rm's FDI choice j, the pro¯t, the union utility, and the domestic consumer surplus
are:
¼N =
4¡ 4t+ 5t2
32
; uN =
µ
2¡ t
4
¶2
; CSN =
(2 + t)2
128
: (1)
(P-FDI): If the monopolist undertakes partial FDI, it maximizes
max
x;y
(1¡ x¡ w)x+ (1¡ y)y:
The ¯rst-order condition leads to
x; y =
1¡ w
2
;
1
2
:
The union loses the foreign market when its ¯rm establishes a plant in the foreign market.
The union's problem is thus de¯ned as
wx =
w(1¡ w)
2
:
The union never sets the wage above the transport cost because it loses all the employment
by doing so. Given this, we can show that
w =
1
2
; x; y =
1
4
;
1
2
:
The pro¯t, the union utility, and the domestic consumer surplus are:
¼P =
5
16
; uP =
1
8
; CSP =
1
32
: (2)
3.2 Welfare e®ects of FDI with one domestic ¯rm
We measure the social e±ciency of FDI by what we refer to as the domestic welfareWj , de¯ned
as Wj ´ ¼j + uj + CSj . The primary purpose here is to show that FDI is in general welfare-
improving in the absence of domestic competition when the ¯xed cost of FDI is su±ciently
small. This is despite the fact that the size of the market that the union can serve is cut
in half when its ¯rm undertakes FDI. This positive e®ect arises because FDI is a type of
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cost-reducing investment which allows the ¯rm to save transport costs, and always dominates
the loss of employment.10
In order to investigate the relationship between the ¯rm's optimal choice and the overall
social e±ciency, we need to explicitly incorporate the ¯xed cost into the model. Let CP denote
the ¯xed cost necessary for partial FDI. Given this, the monopolist undertakes FDI if and
only if
¼P ¡ CP ¸ ¼N , 6 + 4t¡ 5t
2
32
¸ CP : (3)
It is, on the other hand, socially e±cient to undertake FDI if and only if
WP ¡ CP ¸WN , 8 + 44t¡ 29t
2
128
¸ CP : (4)
Examining these two conditions one can see that (3) is implied by (4) for t · ¹t, indicating
that the incentive for FDI is in general excessive. This implies that simple transfer payments
to subsidize outward FDI would never improve welfare.
Although simple transfers would not work even in this monopolistic case, the government
can in general do more than just distributing subsidies. As stated in the introduction, the
government may provide public goods and services (hereafter, we simply call them public
goods), through disseminating information or providing various types of support, to reduce
the ¯xed cost of FDI, thereby encouraging domestic ¯rms to expand abroad. To see whether
this type of government intervention can be ever warranted, we suppose that the government
is able to provide public goods which reduce the ¯xed cost of FDI to ¸0Cj whereas the cost
of providing those public goods is denoted by ¸1Cj . Let ¸ ´ ¸0+ ¸1 denote the social cost of
FDI (the total cost incurred by the home country) where ¸ captures the social e±ciency of
the government intervention. We assume ¸ 2 (0; 1) so that the government intervention itself
is e±cient in that it decreases the social cost of FDI. Our question is then whether and when
the government intervention of this type is justi¯ed. Under this formulation, the condition
for the social e±ciency is now given by
8 + 44t¡ 29t2
128
¸ ¸CP : (5)
10This conclusion holds when the home and foreign markets are comparable in size. If the foreign market
is su±ciently larger than the home market, the loss of employment becomes more signi¯cant and a situation
arises where FDI is welfare-reducing.
9
Note that the left-hand side is always positive for t · ¹t, meaning that this condition holds
for any given CP if ¸ is su±ciently small. This suggests that the government intervention is
indeed justi¯able as long as it is su±ciently e±cient.
4 Main Results
4.1 Equilibrium wages and quantities
We now extend the analysis by introducing another domestic ¯rm (¯rm B) and examine
the e®ect of domestic competition on the home market. Suppose that a new ¯rm (¯rm B)
along with its union (union B) enters into the market for some exogenous reasons. Firm B
is assumed to be identical to ¯rm A in every aspect. The addition of a competing domestic
rival results in strategic interactions absent in the benchmark case.
With this addition, the model becomes increasingly complicated because there are gener-
ically three possible pairs of FDI decisions: (i) none of the ¯rms undertakes FDI (N-FDI,
N-FDI); (ii) only one of the ¯rms undertakes partial FDI (P-FDI, N-FDI); (iii) both of the
¯rms undertake partial FDI (P-FDI, P-FDI). We now examine each case in turn.
(N-FDI, N-FDI): With both of the ¯rms remaining in the home country, each ¯rm max-
imizes
max
xi;yi
(1¡ (xi + x¡i)¡ wi)xi + (1¡ (yi + y¡i)¡ wi ¡ t)yi;
where i 6= ¡i throughout the analysis. Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, the optimal quanti-
ties are obtained as
xi; yi =
1¡ 2wi + w¡i
3
;
1¡ t¡ 2wi + w¡i
3
:
Each union thus maximizes
max
wi
wi(xi + yi) =
wi(2¡ t¡ 4wi + 2w¡i)
3
; s:t: 1¡ t¡ 2wi + w¡i ¸ 0:
It is conceptually straightforward, though computationally tedious, to solve this problem (see
Appendix A for more detail). The equilibrium wages and quantities are given by
wi =
(2¡ t)
6
; xi; yi =
4 + t
18
;
4¡ 5t
18
:
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Let ¼ijk, u
i
jk, CSjk denote the (equilibrium) pro¯t, the union utility and the consumer surplus
when the pair of FDI choices is given by (j; k), j; k 2 fN;Pg. With some algebra, we obtain
¼iNN =
16¡ 16t+ 13t2
162
; uiNN =
(2¡ t)2
27
; CSNN =
(4 + t)2
162
:
(P-FDI, N-FDI): This is an intriguing case which apparently never occurs with one do-
mestic ¯rm. In this situation each union faces di®erent demand schedules for labor: as a
consequence, two di®erent wages prevail in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, suppose
that ¯rm A undertakes partial FDI.
Suppose that ¯rm B chooses a nonnegative quantity to export (because the wage set by
its union is su±ciently low relative to the transport cost). Each ¯rm's problem is then de¯ned
as
max
xA;yA
(1¡ (xA + xB)¡ wA)xA + (1¡ (yA + yB))yA
max
xB ;yB
(1¡ (xA + xB)¡ wB)xB + (1¡ (yA + yB)¡ wB ¡ t)yB:
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, the optimal quantities are obtained as
xA; yA =
1 + wB ¡ 2wA
3
;
1 + t+ wB
3
xB; yB =
1¡ 2wB + wA
3
;
1¡ 2t¡ 2wB
3
: (6)
Since ¯rm A has two plants, the unions are now asymmetric. Each union maximizes
max
wA
wAxA =
wA(1 + wB ¡ 2wA)
3
;
max
wB
wB(xB + yB) =
wB(2¡ 2t+ wA ¡ 4wB)
3
:
It also follows from (6) that if (1 ¡ 2t ¡ 2wB)=3 · 0, ¯rm B chooses not to export. The
optimal quantities in this case are given by
xA; yA =
1 + wB ¡ 2wA
3
;
1
2
; xB; yB =
1¡ 2wB + wA
3
; 0
and each union now maximizes
max
wi
wixi =
wi(1 + w¡i ¡ 2wi)
3
:
De¯ne
t¤ ´ 54¡ 31
p
2
48
» 0:212:
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With some algebra (see Appendix A), the equilibrium wages are given by
wA =
8>><>>:
2(5¡ t)
31
if t 2 [0; t¤)
1
3
if t 2 [t¤; ¹t];
wB =
8>><>>:
9¡ 8t
31
if t 2 [0; t¤)
1
3
if t 2 [t¤; ¹t]:
It follows from these that the equilibrium quantities are
xA; yA =
8>><>>:
4(5¡ t)
93
;
40 + 23t
93
if t 2 [0; t¤)
2
9
;
1
2
if t 2 [t¤; ¹t];
xB; yB =
8><>:
23 + 14t
93
;
13¡ 46t
93
if t 2 [0; t¤)
2
9
; 0 if t 2 [t¤; ¹t]:
The pro¯t, the union utility, and the consumer surplus are
¼APN =
16(5¡ t)2
8649
+
(40 + 23t)2
8649
; ¼BPN =
(23 + 14t)2
8649
+
(13¡ 46t)2
8649
;
uAPN =
8(5¡ t)2
2883
; uBPN =
4(9¡ 8t)2
2883
; CSNP =
(43 + 10t)2
17298
;
for t 2 [0; t¤) and
¼APN =
97
324
; ¼BPN =
4
81
; uAPN = u
B
PN =
2
27
; CSPN =
16
162
;
for t 2 [t¤; ¹t).
(P-FDI, P-FDI): Suppose that ¯rm B follows ¯rm A and sets up a plant in the foreign
market. When each of the ¯rms has two plants, each ¯rm maximizes
max
xi;yi
(1¡ (xi + x¡i)¡ wi)xi + (1¡ (yi + y¡i))yi:
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, we obtain
xi; yi =
1¡ 2wi + w¡i
3
;
1
3
:
In this case, the wage set by a union has no e®ect on the foreign market. With no strategic
consideration, each union simply maximizes
max
wi
wixi =
wi(1¡ 2wi + w¡i)
3
:
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It is straightforward to obtain
wi =
1
3
; xi; yi =
2
9
;
1
3
:
The pro¯t, the union utility, and the consumer surplus are
¼iPP =
13
81
; uiPP =
2
27
; CSPP =
8
81
:
4.2 Equilibrium FDI patterns
(N-FDI, N-FDI): The pair appears as an equilibrium outcome if and only if
¼iNN ¸ ¼APN ¡ CP , CP ¸ ¼APN ¡ ¼iNN ´ H1:
It is intuitively clear that no ¯rm undertakes FDI when its ¯xed cost is large, relative to the
transport cost t.
(P-FDI, N-FDI): The pair appears as an equilibrium outcome if and only if
¼APN ¡ CP ¸ ¼iNN ; ¼BPN ¸ ¼iPP ¡ CP , H1 ¸ CP ; CP ¸ ¼iPP ¡ ¼BPN ´ H2:
The pair is supported as an equilibrium if CP is neither too large nor too small, as expected.
The lowerbound of CP is determined by ¯rm B which has not undertaken FDI. As can
be seen from Figure 1, the lowerbound of CP is not monotonic with respect to t: that is,
an increase in the transport cost may actually reduce the incentive to undertake FDI. This
somewhat counterintuitive result stems from the fact that wB, the wage paid by ¯rm B,
actually decreases with t because ¯rm B now faces intense competition with ¯rm A in the
foreign market and its union is hence forced to lower the wage demands.11 Since this e®ect is
wiped out and wB suddenly goes up once ¯rm B undertakes FDI, the incentive to undertake
FDI could decrease with an increase in t.
(P-FDI, P-FDI): The pair appears as an equilibrium outcome if and only if
¼iPP ¡ CP ¸ ¼BPN , H2 ¸ CP :
Both of the ¯rms apparently undertake FDI when CP is su±ciently small.
11See Ishida and Matsushima (2005) for more detail on this.
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The equilibrium pattern depends on the ¯xed cost CP as well as the transport cost, which
is depicted in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
4.3 Welfare e®ects of FDI with two domestic ¯rms
When there is only one domestic ¯rm, FDI is welfare-improving when its ¯xed cost is su±-
ciently small. This leads us to the following question: is more FDI in general bene¯cial for
the home economy? As it turns out, the answer to this question is mostly negative; this is so
even when we disregard the ¯xed cost of FDI. We in particular show that the second FDI is
normally welfare-reducing in this two-¯rm setting.
Outward FDI gives rise to two distinct e®ects of particular interest. First, FDI improves
the ¯rm's e±ciency as it allows the ¯rm to gain access to cheaper labor as well as to save the
transport cost. Both of them apparently contribute to a reduction in the cost of production
and thus play a similar role to cost-reducing R&D investment directed at the foreign market.
We refer to this as the productivity e®ect of FDI, which is generally welfare-improving.
When the production process involves immobile factors such as labor, FDI also has an
impact on the factor prices because the union's wage-setting behavior hinges critically on the
productivity of its downstream ¯rm. When FDI is undertaken, the union is consequently
forced to concentrate on the home market. Since the ¯rm can serve the home market more
e®ectively by the margin of the transport cost, there arises an incentive for the union to raise
its wage to take advantage of this situation. The consequences of this incentive are not simply
a matter of distributional concern since the wage levels subsequently determine the output
levels. We refer to this as the factor-price e®ect of FDI. The factor-price e®ect may or may
not be welfare-improving, depending crucially on the structure of FDI. When only ¯rm A
undertakes FDI, there arises a productivity gap between the two ¯rms in terms of supplying
to the foreign market. In order to ¯ll this gap and to compete in the foreign market, union B
has a strong incentive to lower its wage, which also places downward pressure on the wage set
by union A. The presence of the rival ¯rm, which remains entirely in the home market, thus
acts as an anchor to keep the wages low and improves welfare under certain conditions. Note
that this incentive is totally wiped out when ¯rm B follows its rival and undertakes FDI. The
wages tend to go up rather sharply as a consequence. To see this, Figure 2 illustrates the
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relationship between the equilibrium wages and the pattern of FDI. The ¯gure shows that the
wages are likely to be lower when only one ¯rm undertakes FDI.
[Figure 2 about here]
We are now ready to examine the social e±ciency of FDI in this duopolistic setting. To
this end, as above, de¯ne the domestic welfare given the pair of FDI choices (j; k) as
Wjk ´ ¼Ajk + ¼Bjk + uAjk + uBjk + CSjk:
The domestic economy consists of three components: the ¯rms, the unions and domestic
consumers. In order to identify who gains and who loses, we examine each component in
turn.
Total pro¯t: It can be shown that the ¯rm that undertakes FDI can always increase its
pro¯t. This does not necessarily mean, however, that FDI always increases the ¯rms' total
pro¯t because a ¯rm may gain at the expense of its rival ¯rm.
To see this, Figure 3 depicts the total pro¯t as a function of t. First, it can be seen
from the ¯gure that the ¯rst FDI unambiguously increases the total pro¯t. The productivity
e®ect is evidently a crucial contributing factor in this. Moreover, when the transport cost
is su±ciently small, the wage e®ect also works positively for the ¯rms as it invites intense
competition between the unions. While the factor-price e®ect leads to higher wages as the
transport cost increases, the productivity e®ect generally prevails and the overall e®ect of the
¯rst FDI on the total pro¯t is in general positive.
[Figure 3 about here]
While the ¯rst FDI in general increases the total pro¯t, the e®ect of the second FDI is more
ambiguous. In particular, when t 2 [t¤; ¹t], the second FDI actually decreases the total pro¯t.
This is because, in this range, the transport cost is so large that ¯rm B (or more precisely
union B) chooses not to export to the foreign market: as a result, ¯rm A can monopolize the
foreign market. The total pro¯t naturally declines as the foreign market becomes duopolistic.
In any event, though, the ¯gure indicates that the e®ect of the second FDI on the total pro¯t
seems to be fairly negligible, compared to that of the ¯rst FDI. This implies that the ¯rms'
gains associated with FDI are almost fully exploited by the ¯rst FDI.
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Total union utility: With the relocation of productive capacities, the unions inevitably
lose employment to foreign workers. Intuition thus suggests that the unambiguous loser of
FDI is the unions. This intuition is in general true for the ¯rst FDI, but there are situations
where the unions are actually made better o® by the second FDI. The driving force behind
this result is the presence of domestic competition. When only ¯rm A undertakes FDI and
t 2 [0; t¤], union B is placed in a di±cult situation since it needs to lower its wage to compete
in the foreign market. Note that this downward pressure works adversely for union A as
well since it must also lower its wage in response to union B's wage-setting behavior. The
second FDI may be bene¯cial for the unions as a whole because they no longer have this
competitive pressure on their wages. This implies that the fact that the ¯rm can export and
potentially capture the foreign market may sometimes work adversely for the unions because
it leads to excessive price competition between them.12 As a result, there may arise a situation
where FDI bene¯ts the unions because it serves to soften price competition between them by
depriving them of the option of exporting altogether. See Figure 4. The next proposition
summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 When (i) there are two domestic ¯rms and (ii) the two markets are symmetric
in size, there exists some ~t 2 (0; t¤) such that the unions bene¯t from the second FDI for
t 2 [~t; t¤].
[Figure 4 about here]
While the incentive to lower the wage to compete in the foreign market becomes stronger
as t increases, it eventually reaches a point where it no longer pays o® for union B to continue
to do so. The union then gives up the foreign market and instead raises its wage to compensate
for the loss of the market: that is, the union behaves as if its ¯rm undertakes FDI. This also
releases union A from the downward pressure on its wage. When t 2 [t¤; ¹t], therefore, the
second FDI has no e®ect on how union B behaves because its ¯rm does not export in the ¯rst
place. As a result, nothing changes as far as the unions are concerned when the second FDI
is undertaken.
12Apparently, the unions can avoid this problem if the union, whose ¯rm does not undertake FDI, can
somehow credibly commit itself to setting higher wages and thus staying out of the foreign market.
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Domestic consumers: The consumer surplus is ultimately determined by the wages set by
the unions. Higher wages are detrimental to consumers since they result in higher prices and
less output. By comparing Figures 4 and 5, one can see that the unions' gains are roughly
consumers' losses and vice versa. In this sense, the consumer surplus can be seen as a °ip side
of the union utility.
[Figure 5 about here]
In general, the consumer surplus is minimized when both of the ¯rms undertake FDI
because the factor-price e®ect pushes the wages upward. The ¯rst FDI is bene¯cial for con-
sumers when t 2 [0; t¤] because upstream competition between the unions over the foreign
market drives down the wages. The second FDI is, on the other hand, always detrimental
to consumers because it releases the unions from this downward pressure on the wages. This
indicates that while FDI as a device to soften price competition bene¯ts the unions, it works
adversely for consumers because of less output resulting from higher wages. This result is
summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 When (i) there are two domestic ¯rms and (ii) the two markets are symmetric
in size, the consumer surplus is minimized when both of the ¯rms undertake FDI.
The loss incurred by consumers dues to the second FDI constitutes a substantial part of
the overall welfare loss, as we will see next.
Domestic welfare: There are several forces at work as illustrated, depending on t. Figure
6 compares equilibrium and social e±ciency. The ¯gure again indicates that the incentive to
undertake FDI is generally excessive, as in the case with one domestic ¯rm. This shows that
simple transfer payments to encourage FDI would never be welfare-improving.
As far as policy issues are concerned, we are more interested in the case where the gov-
ernment can to some extent reduce the ¯xed cost of FDI by removing barriers or providing
public goods to facilitate outward FDI. To see this, Figure 7 illustrates the welfare e®ect of
FDI when the ¯xed cost of FDI vanishes to zero. The ¯gure consistently reveals that there
exists a non-monotonic relationship between the domestic welfare and the amount of FDI: the
¯rst FDI is always welfare-improving while the second FDI is always welfare-reducing. The
driving force behind this is again the presence of upstream competition. In particular, the
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¯rst FDI leads to intense rivalry between the unions and consequently results in welfare gains,
although the competition may be excessively intense from the unions' viewpoint. Note also
that, when t is su±ciently small, the domestic welfare is minimized when both of the ¯rms
undertake FDI, i.e., (P-FDI, P-FDI) is worse, in terms of the domestic welfare, than not only
(P-FDI, N-FDI) but also (N-FDI, N-FDI). This draws clear contrast to the case with one
domestic ¯rm where outward FDI is always welfare-improving, provided that the markets are
comparable in size. The following statement summarizes the main result of the paper.
Proposition 3 When (i) there are two domestic ¯rms, (ii) the two markets are symmetric
in size and (iii) the ¯xed cost of FDI is negligibly small, the domestic welfare is maximized
for any t 2 [0; ¹t] when only one of the ¯rms undertakes FDI. Alternatively, the second FDI is
always welfare-reducing.
[Figure 6 about here]
Note that this result overturns the insight obtained in the case with only one domestic
¯rm, where any government intervention to encourage outward FDI is warranted as long as
the government can reduce the ¯xed cost down to some negligible level. This ¯nding amounts
to a critical policy implication: there are indeed such things as \excessive FDI" and any form
of government intervention, no matter how e±cient it is, can be bene¯cial only up to some
point.
[Figure 7 about here]
5 The case with full FDI
In the baseline case, we do not allow ¯rms to relocate entirely to the foreign market. Under
certain conditions, however, it may be the best interest of a ¯rm to shift all of its productive
capacity to the foreign market. We now introduce this additional option of full FDI and
investigate how this modi¯cation alters our analysis.
5.1 Benchmark with one domestic ¯rm
We follow the same steps as in the main text and start with the benchmark case where there
is only one domestic ¯rm. Here, the monopolist faces three alternatives, j 2 fN;P; Fg, to
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choose from. Since the ¯rst two alternatives, j = N;P , are already discussed, however, we
only need to look at the case where the monopolist undertakes full FDI.
(F-FDI): If the monopolist undertakes full FDI, it maximizes
max
x;y
(1¡ x¡ t)x+ (1¡ y)y:
The ¯rst-order condition leads to
x; y =
1¡ t
2
;
1
2
:
In this case, the union ends up with zero rent. The pro¯t and the domestic consumer surplus
are:
¼F =
2¡ 2t+ t2
4
; CSF =
(1¡ t)2
8
:
Let CF denote the ¯xed cost of full FDI. It is perhaps more natural to assume that
CF > CP , but we do not impose any restriction on the relationship between CP and CF .
Figure 8 illustrates the social e±ciency and the equilibrium pattern for di®erent values of t.
[Figure 8 about here]
There are two observations we can make here. First, the ¯gure indicates that the incentive
to undertake FDI, either partial or full, is in general excessive. Second, FDI is socially desirable
when its ¯xed cost is negligible. These observations are basically in line with those when only
partial FDI is an option, and hence all the welfare and policy implications are preserved.
5.2 Domestic competition and full FDI
We now introduce another domestic ¯rm to see the impact of domestic competition. With
the addition of full FDI, there are generically six possible pairs of FDI decisions: (i) none of
the ¯rms undertakes FDI (N-FDI, N-FDI); (ii) only one of the ¯rms undertakes partial FDI
(P-FDI, N-FDI); (iii) both of the ¯rms undertake partial FDI (P-FDI, P-FDI); (iv) only one
of the ¯rms undertakes full FDI (F-FDI, N-FDI); (v) one of the ¯rms undertakes full FDI and
the other does partial FDI (F-FDI, P-FDI); (vi) both of the ¯rms undertake full FDI (F-FDI,
F-FDI). Since computation is tedious and mostly a repetition of what has been presented thus
far, the derivation of equilibrium is placed in Appendix A.
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The results are summarized in Figure 9, which illustrates the socially e±cient pattern of
FDI for di®erent values of t. The socially e±cient pattern is slightly more complicated than in
the case where only partial FDI is available, but the main message remains intact: for a wide
range of parameter values, the asymmetric pattern of FDI, where only one ¯rm undertakes
either partial or full FDI, is socially desirable. This is so even when the ¯xed costs of FDI,
both CP and CF , are negligibly small. For instance, when t = 1=10, both ¯rms undertaking
any form of FDI is never socially e±cient even when the ¯xed costs tend to zero.13 This result
again roughly con¯rms our main contention that any form of government intervention can be
bene¯cial only up to some point, no matter how e±cient the intervention is, even with the
option of full FDI.
[Figure 9 about here]
6 Conclusion
The paper constructs a model of unionized duopoly and explores welfare and policy impli-
cations of outward FDI. It is found that the presence of domestic competition gives rise
to welfare e®ects that lead to a non-monotonic relationship between social welfare and the
amount of FDI. With the strategic interaction between the unions, the amount of FDI can be
excessive even when FDI is totally costless. The present analysis identi¯es a possible mech-
anism through which outward FDI actually reduces welfare in the home economy, as often
argued informally, and thus raises a critical policy implication: whether outward FDI should
be encouraged depends on the nature of domestic competition, especially in its relation to
upstream input suppliers. When the unions possess strong bargaining power, asymmetric pat-
terns of FDI, where only a subset of ¯rms undertakes FDI, are desirable from the social point
of view for a wide range of parameter values. This implies that there are indeed such things as
\excessive FDI" and encouraging (or even subsidizing) more FDI could be bene¯cial only up
to some point. Although ultimate long-run consequences of outward FDI are not necessarily
transparent in our partial-equilibrium framework, the paper illuminates an important aspect
that should be carefully taken into account by policymakers. Since our analysis is con¯ned in
a relatively simple framework to make our points succinctly, it is of some interest to extend
13When the transport cost t becomes even smaller and tends to zero, there arises a small range of CF for
which (F-FDI, F-FDI) is socially e±cient.
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the present analysis to various settings to gain further insight on the home-country welfare
e®ect of outward FDI.
Appendix A
A1. Without full FDI
When each ¯rm can choose either no FDI or partial FDI, there are generically three pairs of
FDI decisions. Since (P-FDI, P-FDI) is computationally straightforward, we cover the other
two cases in more detail.
(N-FDI, N-FDI): In this situation, each ¯rm may choose not to export, depending on the
wage set by its union. If both of the ¯rms choose to export, we obtain
wi =
2 + 2w¡i ¡ t
8
;
which leads to
wi =
2¡ t
6
; xi; yi =
4 + t
18
;
4¡ 5t
18
:
It follows from this that each union's utility is
ui =
(2¡ t)2
27
: (A.1)
We now show that this pair of wages indeed constitutes an equilibrium. To see this,
it su±ces to show that each union has no incentive to deviate from this wage level taking
the other union's wage as given. If a union unilaterally deviates and prevents its ¯rm from
exporting, the objective function becomes
max
wi
wixi =
wi(1¡ 2wi + w¡i)
3
; s:t: 1¡ t¡ 2wi + w¡i < 0:
If t < 8=13, the constraint is binding and we have
wi =
1¡ t+ w¡i
2
=
8¡ 7t
12
; xi; yi =
t
3
; 0:
The union's utility when it deviates is then
ui =
(8¡ 7t)t
36
: (A.2)
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There is no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium if (A.1) is larger than (A.2),
i.e.,
(2¡ t)2
27
¸ (8¡ 7t)t
36
:
It is straightforward to verify that this holds for any t.
(P-FDI, N-FDI): In this situation, ¯rm B may choose not to export, depending on the
wage set by union B. Suppose ¯rst that the wage set by union B is low enough for ¯rm B to
export. The ¯rst-order conditions then imply that
xA; yA =
1¡ 2wA + wB
3
;
1 + wB
3
;
xB; yB =
1 + wA ¡ 2wB
3
;
1¡ 2wB ¡ 2t
3
:
The maximization problem for each union becomes
max
wA
wAxA =
wA(1¡ 2wA + wB)
3
;
max
wB
wB(xB + yB) =
wB(2 + wA ¡ 4wB ¡ 2t)
3
; s:t:
1¡ 2wB ¡ 2t
3
¸ 0:
If t < 13=46, the constraint is not binding, the optimal wages must satisfy
wA =
1 + wB
4
; wB =
2 + wA ¡ 2t
8
:
We can then show that
wA =
10¡ 2t
31
; wB =
9¡ 8t
31
; xA; yA =
20¡ 4t
31
;
40¡ 23t
31
; xB; yB =
23 + 14t
93
;
13¡ 46t
93
:
It follows from these that union B's utility is
uB =
4(9¡ 8t)2
2883
: (A.3)
Now suppose that union B raises the wage to the level that makes ¯rm B unable to export.
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, we have
xA; yA =
1¡ 2wA + wB
3
;
1
2
; xB; yB =
1 + wA ¡ 2wB
3
; 0:
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The maximization problem for each union now becomes
max
wA
wAxA =
wA(1¡ 2wA + wB)
3
;
max
wB
wBxB =
wB(1 + wA ¡ 2wB)
3
; s:t:
1¡ 2wB ¡ 2t
3
< 0:
If t > 1=6, the constraint is not binding and the optimal wages and quantities are given by
wA = wB =
1
3
; xA; yA =
2
9
;
1
2
; xB; yB =
2
9
; 0:
It follows from these that union B's utility is
uB =
2
27
: (A.4)
Union B then chooses the latter strategy, which prevents ¯rm B from exporting, if (A.4)
exceeds (A.3), i.e.,
2
27
¡ 4(9¡ 8t)
2
2883
> 0; ) t > 54¡ 31
p
2
48
» 0:212:
A2. With full FDI
With the option of full FDI, there arise three additional pairs of FDI decision. We examine
each case in turn.
(F-FDI, N-FDI): In this situation each union faces di®erent demand schedules for labor: as
a consequence, two di®erent wages prevail in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, suppose
that ¯rm A is the one to undertake full FDI
Suppose that ¯rm B chooses a nonnegative quantity to export (because the wage set by
its union is su±ciently low relative to the transport cost). Each ¯rm's problem is then de¯ned
as
max
xA;yA
(1¡ (xA + xB)¡ t)xA + (1¡ (yA + yB))yA
max
xB ;yB
(1¡ (xA + xB)¡ wB)xB + (1¡ (yA + yB)¡ wB ¡ t)yB:
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, the optimal quantities are obtained as
xA; yA =
1 + wB ¡ 2t
3
;
1 + t+ wB
3
xB; yB =
1¡ 2wB + t
3
;
1¡ 2t¡ 2wB
3
: (A.5)
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Since ¯rm A does not have plants at the domestic market, only the union of ¯rm B exists.
The union maximizes
max
wB
wB(xB + yB) =
wB(2¡ t¡ 4wB)
3
:
It also follows from (A.5) that if (1 ¡ 2t ¡ 2wB)=3 · 0, ¯rm B chooses not to export. The
optimal quantities in this case are given by
xA; yA =
1 + wB ¡ 2t
3
;
1
2
; xB; yB =
1¡ 2wB + t
3
; 0:
and the union now maximizes
max
wB
wBxB =
wB(1 + t¡ 2wB)
3
:
De¯ne
t¤¤ ´ 3
p
2¡ 4:
With some algebra, the equilibrium wage is given by
wB =
(
(2¡ t)=8 if t 2 [0; t¤¤)
(1 + t)=4 if t 2 [t¤¤; ¹t];
It follows from these that the equilibrium quantities are
xA; yA =
8>><>>:
10¡ 17t
24
;
10 + 7t
24
if t 2 [0; t¤¤)
5¡ 7t
12
;
1
2
if t 2 [t¤¤; ¹t];
xB; yB =
8>><>>:
2 + 5t
12
;
2¡ 7t
12
if t 2 [0; t¤¤)
1 + t
6
; 0 if t 2 [t¤¤; ¹t]:
The pro¯t, the total union utility, and the consumer surplus are
¼AFN =
100(1¡ t) + 169t2
288
; ¼BFN =
4¡ 4t+ 37t2
72
;
uAFN + u
B
FN =
(2¡ t)2
48
; CSFN =
49(2¡ t)2
1152
:
for t 2 [0; t¤¤), and
¼AFN =
61¡ 70t+ 49t2
144
; ¼BFN =
(1 + t)2
36
;
uAFN + u
B
FN =
(1 + t)2
24
; CSFN =
(7¡ 5t)2
288
:
for t 2 [t¤¤; ¹t).
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(F-FDI, P-FDI): Without loss of generality, suppose that ¯rm A is the one to undertake
full FDI. Each ¯rm's problem is de¯ned as
max
xA;yA
(1¡ (xA + xB)¡ t)xA + (1¡ (yA + yB))yA
max
xB ;yB
(1¡ (xA + xB)¡ wB)xB + (1¡ (yA + yB))yB:
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, the optimal quantities are obtained as
xA; yA =
1 + wB ¡ 2t
3
;
1
3
; xB; yB =
1¡ 2wB + t
3
;
1
3
:
Since ¯rm A does not have plants at the domestic market, only the union of ¯rm B exists.
The union maximizes
max
wB
wBxB =
wB(1¡ 2wB + t)
3
:
With some algebra, the equilibrium wage is given by
wB =
1 + t
4
:
The equilibrium quantities are
xA; yA =
5¡ 7t
12
;
1
3
; xB; yB =
1 + t
6
;
1
3
:
The pro¯t, the total union utility, and the consumer surplus are
¼AFP =
41¡ 70t+ 49t2
144
; ¼BFP =
5 + 2t+ t2
36
;
uAFP + u
B
FP =
(1 + t)2
24
; CSFP =
(7¡ 5t)2
288
:
(F-FDI, F-FDI): This case is quite simple as it is reduced to a standard Cournot model
with no union. Each ¯rm's problem is de¯ned as
max
xA;yA
(1¡ (xA + xB)¡ t)xA + (1¡ (yA + yB))yA
max
xB ;yB
(1¡ (xA + xB)¡ t)xB + (1¡ (yA + yB))yB:
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, the optimal quantities are obtained as
xA; yA =
1¡ t
3
;
1
3
; xB; yB =
1¡ t
3
;
1
3
:
The pro¯t and the consumer surplus are
¼iFF =
2¡ 2t+ t2
9
; CSFF =
2(1¡ t)2
9
:
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Appendix B: Extensions
In the analysis thus far, we have only considered a particular environment to make our points.
In this appendix, we extend the basic setup in two di®erent ways to show the basic insight is
robust to these alternations.
B.1 The case with a foreign ¯rm
We introduce a foreign ¯rm into the baseline case, along with one or two ¯rms in the domestic
market. The foreign ¯rm, denoted by F , produces its product with a constant marginal cost
which is normalized to zero and supplies its products to both markets if it chooses to do
so. Every other aspect of the model follows the baseline case in the main text. To make
comparison easier, all the results are summarized in ¯gures 1F-7F, each of which corresponds
to ¯gures 1-7 for the baseline case.
(N-FDI, N-FDI): With both of the ¯rms remaining in the home country, each ¯rm max-
imizes
max
xi;yi
(1¡ (xi + x¡i + xF )¡ wi)xi + (1¡ (yi + y¡i + yF )¡ wi ¡ t)yi;
max
xF ;yF
(1¡ (xA + xB + xF )¡ t)xF + (1¡ (yA + yB + yF ))yF :
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, the optimal quantities are obtained as
xi; yi =
1 + t¡ 3wi + wj
4
;
1¡ 2t¡ 3wi + wj
4
; ;
xF ; yF =
1¡ 3t+ wA + wB
4
;
1 + 2t+ wA + wB
4
:
Each union thus maximizes
max
wi
wi(xi + yi) =
wi(2¡ t¡ 6wi + 2wj)
4
:
The equilibrium wages and quantities are given by
wi =
(2¡ t)
10
; xi; yi =
3(1 + 2t)
20
;
3(1¡ 3t)
20
:
Let ¼ijk, u
i
jk, CSjk denote the (equilibrium) pro¯t, the union utility and the consumer surplus
when the pair of FDI choices is given by (j; k), j; k 2 fN;Pg. With some algebra, we obtain
¼iNN =
2¡ 2t+ 13t2
72
; uiNN =
3(2¡ t)2
200
; CSNN =
(13¡ 4t)2
800
:
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(P-FDI, N-FDI): In this situation, ¯rm B may choose not to export, depending on the
wage set by union B. Suppose ¯rst that the wage set by union B is low enough for ¯rm B to
export. The ¯rst-order conditions then imply that
xA; yA =
1 + t¡ 3wA + wB
4
;
1 + t+ wB
4
; xB; yB =
1 + t¡ 3wB + wA
4
;
1¡ 3t¡ 3wB
4
:
The maximization problem for each union becomes
max
wA
wAxA =
wA(1 + t¡ 3wA + wB)
4
;
max
wB
wB(xB + yB) =
wB(2¡ 2t¡ 6wB + wA)
4
; s:t:
1¡ 3wB ¡ 3t
4
¸ 0:
If t < 8=45, the constraint is not binding, the optimal wage is
wA; wB =
14 + 10t
71
;
13¡ 11t
71
:
We can then show that
xA; yA =
23 + 57t
142
;
3(7¡ 5t)
71
; xB; yB =
3(7 + 5t)
142
;
8¡ 45t
71
:
It follows from these that the union's utility is
uI =
3(13¡ 11t)2
10082
: (B.6)
Now suppose that union B raises the wage to the level that makes ¯rm B unable to export.
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, we have
xA; yA =
1 + t¡ 3wA + wB
4
;
1
3
; xB; yB =
1 + t¡ 3wB + wB
4
; 0:
The maximization problem for each union now becomes
max
wA
wAxA =
wA(1 + t¡ 3wA + wB)
4
;
max
wB
wBxB =
wB(1 + t¡ 3wB + wA)
4
; s:t:
1¡ 3t¡ 3wB
4
< 0:
If t > 1=9, the constraint is not binding and the optimal wages and quantities are given by
wi =
1 + t
5
; xA = xB =
3(1 + t)
20
:
It follows from these that the union's utility is
ui =
3(1 + t)2
100
: (B.7)
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The union then chooses the latter strategy, which prevents ¯rm B from exporting, if (B.7)
exceeds (B.6), i.e.,
3(1 + t)2
100
¡ 3(13¡ 11t)
2
10082
> 0; ) t > 12191¡ 8520
p
2
1009
» 0:0981 ´ tF :
The pro¯t, the union utility, and the consumer surplus are
¼APN =
90(49 + 70t+ 25t2)
40328
; ¼BPN =
1570¡ 516t+ 22698t2
40328
;
uAPN =
3(7 + 5t)2
5041
; uBPN =
3(13¡ 11t)2
10082
; CSNP =
(93¡ 35t)2
40328
;
for t 2 [0; tF ) and
¼APN =
481 + 162t+ 81t2
3600
; ¼BPN =
9(1 + t)2
400
; uiPN =
3(1 + t)2
100
; CSPN =
(13¡ 7t)2
800
;
for t 2 [tF ; ¹t).
(P-FDI, P-FDI): Suppose that ¯rm B follows ¯rm A and sets up a plant in the foreign
market. When each of the ¯rms has two plants, each ¯rm maximizes
max
xi;yi
(1¡ (xi + x¡i + xF )¡ wi)xi + (1¡ (yi + y¡i + yF ))yi:
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, we obtain
xi; yi =
1 + t¡ 3wi + wj
4
;
1
4
:
In this case, the wage set by each union has no e®ect on the foreign market. Each union
simply maximizes
max
wi
wixi =
wi(1 + t¡ 3wi + wj)
4
:
It is straightforward to obtain
wi =
1 + t
5
; xi; yi =
3(1 + t)
20
;
1
4
:
The pro¯t, the union utility, and the consumer surplus are
¼iPP =
34 + 18t+ 9t2
400
; uiPP =
3(1 + t)2
100
; CSPP =
(13¡ 7t)2
800
:
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B.2 The case with an integrated union
We now consider the case where all domestic workers are represented by an integrated union.
The integrated union provides labor force and unilaterally o®ers a common wage wI to the
downstream ¯rms. The fact that the unions are integrated is the only departure from the
baseline case. Again, to make comparison easier, all the results are summarized in ¯gures
1I-7I, each of which corresponds to ¯gures 1-7.
(N-FDI, N-FDI): With both of the ¯rms remaining in the home country, each ¯rm max-
imizes
max
xi;yi
(1¡ (xi + x¡i)¡ wI)xi + (1¡ (yi + y¡i)¡ wI ¡ t)yi:
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, the optimal quantities are obtained as
xi; yi =
1¡ wI
3
;
1¡ t¡ wI
3
:
Each union thus maximizes
max
wI
2wI(xi + yi) =
2wi(2¡ t¡ 2wi)
3
:
The equilibrium wages and quantities are given by
wi =
(2¡ t)
4
; xi; yi =
2 + t
12
;
2¡ 3t
12
:
Let ¼ijk, u
i
jk, CSjk denote the (equilibrium) pro¯t, the union utility and the consumer surplus
when the pair of FDI choices is given by (j; k), j; k 2 fN;Pg. With some algebra, we obtain
¼iNN =
4¡ 4t+ 5t2
72
; uINN =
(2¡ t)2
12
; CSNN =
(2 + t)2
72
:
(P-FDI, N-FDI): In this situation, ¯rm B may choose not to export, depending on the
wage set by the integrated union. Suppose ¯rst that the wage set by the union is low enough
for ¯rm B to export. The ¯rst-order conditions then imply that
xA; yA =
1¡ wI
3
;
1 + wI
3
; xB; yB =
1¡ wI
3
;
1¡ 2wI ¡ 2t
3
:
The maximization problem for each union becomes
max
wI
wI(xA + xB + yB) =
wI(3¡ 4wI ¡ 2t)
3
; s:t:
1¡ 2wI ¡ 2t
3
¸ 0:
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If t < 1=6, the constraint is not binding, the optimal wage is
wI =
3¡ 2t
8
:
We can then show that
xA; yA =
5 + 2t
24
;
11 + 6t
24
; xB; yB =
5 + 2t
24
;
1¡ 6t
12
:
It follows from these that the union's utility is
uI =
(3¡ 2t)2
48
: (B.8)
Now suppose that union B raises the wage to the level that makes ¯rm B unable to export.
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, we have
xA; yA =
1¡ wI
3
;
1
2
; xB; yB =
1¡ wI
3
; 0:
The maximization problem for each union now becomes
max
wI
wB(xA + xB) =
wI(2¡ wI)
3
; s:t:
1¡ 2wI ¡ 2t
3
< 0:
For any t, the constraint is not binding and the optimal wages and quantities are given by
wI =
1
2
; xA = xB =
1
6
:
It follows from these that the union's utility is
uI =
1
6
: (B.9)
The union then chooses the latter strategy, which prevents ¯rm B from exporting, if (B.9)
exceeds (B.8), i.e.,
1
6
¡ (3¡ 2t)
2
48
> 0; ) t > 3¡ 2
p
2
2
» 0:0858 ´ tI :
The pro¯t, the union utility, and the consumer surplus are
¼APN =
73 + 76t+ 20t2
288
; ¼BPN =
29¡ 28t+ 148t2
576
; uIPN =
(3¡ 2t)2
48
; CSNP =
(5 + 2t)2
288
;
for t 2 [0; tI) and
¼APN =
5
18
; ¼BPN =
1
36
; uIPN =
1
6
; CSPN =
1
18
;
for t 2 [tI ; ¹t).
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(P-FDI, P-FDI): Suppose that ¯rm B follows ¯rm A and sets up a plant in the foreign
market. When each of the ¯rms has two plants, each ¯rm maximizes
max
xi;yi
(1¡ (xi + x¡i)¡ wI)xi + (1¡ (yi + y¡i))yi:
Solving the ¯rst-order conditions, we obtain
xi; yi =
1¡ wi
3
;
1
3
:
In this case, the wage set by the integrated union has no e®ect on the foreign market. The
union simply maximizes
max
wI
wI(xA + xB) =
wI(2¡ 2wI)
3
:
It is straightforward to obtain
wI =
1
2
; xi; yi =
1
6
;
1
3
:
The pro¯t, the union utility, and the consumer surplus are
¼iPP =
5
36
; uIPP =
1
6
; CSPP =
1
18
:
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Figure 6: Social e±ciency and equilibrium with two domestic ¯rms
Note: (i¡ j) : (i0 ¡ j0) indicates that the equilibrium is (i¡ j) while the socially e±cient
outcome is (i0 ¡ j0).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4t
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
W
WPN
WNN
WPP
Figure 7: Domestic welfare
35
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5CP
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
CF
Partial FDI
Full FDI
Non FDI
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5CP
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
CF
Partial FDI
Full FDI
Non FDI
social e±ciency equilibrium
Figure 8: Social e±ciency and equilibrium with one domestic ¯rm: the case
with full FDI
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 Cp
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
CF
HN,PL HN,NL
HN,FL
Figure 9: Social e±ciency with two domestic ¯rms: the case with full FDI
36
Figures related to Appendix B.1: The case with a foreign ¯rm
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35t
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
CP
HN-NL
HN-NL
HP-PL
HP-NL
HP-PL
Figure 1F: Equilibrium with a foreign ¯rm
0.050.10.150.20.250.30.35
t
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
w
wBPN
wAPN
wiNN
wiPP
wiPP=w
A
PN=w
B
PN
0.050.10.150.20.250.30.35
t
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Π
2ΠiNN
Π
A
PN+Π
B
PN
Π
A
PN+Π
B
PN
2ΠiPP
Figure 2F: Equilibrium wages Figure 3F: Total pro¯t
0.050.10.150.20.250.30.35
t
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
U
2uiNN
uAPN+u
B
PN uAPN+u
B
PN
2uiPP
0.050.10.150.20.250.30.35
t
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
CS
CSNN
CSPN
CSPN
CSPP
Figure 4F: Total union utility Figure 5F: Domestic consumers surplus
37
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35t
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
CP
HN-NL
HP-NL
HP-PL
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35t
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
CP
HN-NL:HN-NL
HP-NL:HN-NL
HP-PL:HN-NL
HP-PL:HP-NL
HP-PL:HP-PL
HN-NL
HP-PL
:HN-NL
HN-NL
HP-PL
:HP-NL
HP-PL:HP-NL
social e±ciency social e±ciency and equilibrium
Figure 6F: Social e±ciency and equilibrium with two domestic ¯rms
Note: (i¡ j) : (i0 ¡ j0) indicates that the equilibrium is (i¡ j) while the socially e±cient
outcome is (i0 ¡ j0).
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Figures related to Appendix B.2: The case with an integrated union
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Figure 6I: Social e±ciency and equilibrium with two domestic ¯rms
Note: (i¡ j) : (i0 ¡ j0) indicates that the equilibrium is (i¡ j) while the socially e±cient
outcome is (i0 ¡ j0).
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